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Regulatory updates: Maine Public Utilities Commission  
Ralph Townsend 
Electric regulation in Maine seems to have settled on a regulatory detente that would have been 
unthinkable three or five years ago. In a complicated bargain struck among all the major parties, 
the PUC has just approved a price cap regulation program for Central Maine Power. Essentially, 
CMP traded a 15 percent rate reduction for industrial customers and a $100 million write-down 
of deferred expenses for price cap regulation. The price cap formula lets CMP raise rates by the 
rate of inflation (less a productivity adjustment) in each of the next five years. The price cap also 
gives CMP considerable pricing flexibility to meet competition. The cost of the 15 percent 
industrial rate reduction was partially and indirectly financed by those non-utility generators 
whose payments from CMP are tied to industrial rates. The other implicit loser in this bargain 
may have been the environmental movement's long term quest for rate structures that strongly 
favor conservation over generation.  
While Bangor Hydro-electric was not directly affected by this decision, it is asking for similar 
pricing flexibility. An aggressive program to promote electric heat by Bangor Hydro suggests 
that its expects to be permitted similar flexibility in how it conducts its business.  
For NYNEX, a case that includes both consideration of price caps and a more traditional hearing 
on the reasonableness of rates is scheduled to be decided by May 1995. Ordinarily, that schedule 
would look wildly optimistic for a case of this scope. However, the hallmark of PUC Chair 
Thomas Welch seems to be meeting self-imposed regulatory deadlines. Unlike the CMP price 
cap case, it seems unlikely that the PUC will be handed a neatly packaged deal on price cap 
regulation for NYNEX. The decision may require the PUC to make fundamental choices 
between strongly contested positions. Thomas Welch's self-described fascination with price 
regulation may have to squarely face Thomas Welch's conservative legal analysis that any new 
approach to rate-making bears a large burden of proof. Making such a fundamental choice could 
be complicated by the addition of a new commissioner after the expiration of Elizabeth Hughes' 
term in March 1995.  
No regulatory pundit would have foretold seven or ten years ago that price cap regulation would 
be adopted by acclamation in electricity for CMP, while price cap regulation for NYNEX would 
still be very much in doubt. NYNEX has sought price cap regulation for about ten years, and 
price cap regulation of telecommunications has become commonplace in other jurisdictions. 
Price caps in electricity are still relatively rare, and CMP has only recently decided that price 
caps might serve its interests. What forces have propelled this unlikely scenario?  
It seems to me that those who are skeptical about price cap regulation--which seems to include 
representatives of both commercial and residential customers--are asking two questions: Where 
is the clear external threat that necessitates this fundamental change? And what is the company 
giving up in return for this flexibility?  
For electricity, the threatened rush of industrial customers to alternative sources of energy is an 
undeniable external threat. And CMP has been forced to give mightily over the past two years. 
The recent rate case imposed severe penalties on CMP, which led to workforce reductions of 225 
people. The departure of CMP President Matthew Hunter was at least a symbolic sacrifice. And 
the final deal conceded both major rate reductions and resolution of the large regulatory 
deferrals.  
In telecommunications, NYNEX has simply failed to convince many participants of the real 
external pressure. NYNEX has tried to explain the importance of new telecommunications 
services to Maine's businesses and residents. While all the economic development types are 
falling over themselves (and the legislature) about the importance of the "Information Age", 
Maine's telecommunications infrastructure is excellent and any problems difficult to identify. 
And in large part because of the lessons from the Vermont Telecommunications Agreement, 
NYNEX is reluctant to trade major rate concessions for price cap regulation. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Bell system break-up, NYNEX (then New England Telephone) traded no 
increases in basic rates for pricing flexibility in Vermont. High inflation made this deal 
expensive for NYNEX, and the company has seemed reluctant to make similar deals since. So 
perhaps the basic ingredients for a negotiated price cap in telecommunications are simply absent 
in Maine.  
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